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I. Introduction
After the recent Great Recession of 2008, state budgets are facing increased scrutiny in
every area of spending. States are increasingly turning to corrections spending, as one such area,
to look for efficiencies and innovations that will help relieve fiscal stress, while also maintaining
the strict judicial and safety standards expected by the public. However, state corrections
systems are coming out of an imprisonment “binge” during what was often referred to as the
“Tough on Crime” nineties, and without intervention in the form of smarter, more effective
strategies, further uncontrolled growth in the corrections system will prove untenable to the State
of Maine.
This paper will first explore the historical factors leading to the current precipitous
decision point facing state corrections systems, followed by a summary of current budgetary
conditions. It will, finally, examine the success of a number of budgeting and spending
alternatives already in place in state corrections systems across the country, and their
applicability to Maine’s particular situation.

a. The “Tough on Crime” 1990’s
Extensive empirical research has shown that imprisonment, except in rare cases, does not
actually enhance public safety. “Prisons undoubtedly do three things,” Elsa Chen and her
colleagues explain in their thoughtful 2001 study on trends in corrections spending: “First, they
provide a dumping ground for unwanted people. Second, following the ancient image of justice
as a scale, they subject convicts to surroundings whose harshness appears to pay them back for,
or ‘balance out,’ their crimes. And, finally, they signify to the public that Something Has Been
Done [sic]” (Chen, Turner, Greenwood, & Fain, 2001). Still, “research into the use of
3

imprisonment over time and in different countries,” say criminologists Norval Morris and David
Rothman, “has failed to demonstrate any positive correlation between increasing the rate of
imprisonment and reducing the rate of crime” (1995).
Despite all this, the 1990’s saw a cultural shift in the public’s perception of the
corrections system that amounted to a “prison binge” in the US; one that didn’t stop until states
began to run out of money with which to fuel it. This cultural shift towards harsher, more
punitive sentencing measures for criminals was hastened by a confluence of academic publishing
trends and political haymaking.
This movement was at least partially spurred forward by two reports from then-Attorney
General William P. Barr in the early 90’s. One of the reports, entitled “The Case for More
Incarceration,” was released by Barr on October 28, 1992. The report made three basic points:
“First, prisons work. Second, we need more of them. Third, inadequate prison space costs
money” (Barr, 1992). The Barr reports had both substantive and symbolic impact. Despite
subsequent criticisms of them regarding their empirical findings, the statistics and anecdotes
contained therein were nonetheless frequently cited in Congressional proceedings regarding the
1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (or, the 1994 Crime Bill) 1 (Chen,
Turner, Greenwood, & Fain, 2001).
Following a series of high-profile acts of violent crime in the early 90’s, the 1994 Crime
Bill was the largest crime bill in the history of the US at 356 pages and provided for 200,000 new
police officers, $9.7 billion in funding for prisons and $6.1 billion in funding for prevention
programs (Evolution of a Crime Bill, 1994). This bill represented a hefty increase in spending

1

H.R. 3355, Pub.L. 103-322
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and seriousness in responding to crime, and was symbolic of the political aversion to being seen
as “soft” on crime (Schiraldi, 2004).
A 2007 study by Stucky et al. demonstrated that partisan politics, economic and racial
threats, citizen preferences, fiscal considerations, policy priorities, and crime are important
explanations of corrections spending because they affect strategies for maintaining social order,
garnering votes, and maintaining political office. At the end of the day, all these played a role in
the dramatic increase in American state prison populations during the past three decades (Stucky,
Heimer, & Lang, 2007). Said one state Senator from Texas—a state with one of the highest
corrections spending rates in the country—“it’s always been safer politically to build the next
prison, rather than stop and see whether that’s really the smartest thing to do” (The Pew Center
on the States, 2009).
The “get tough” on crime movement’s arsenal included a spate of “Three-Strikes and
You’re Out” and Truth-In-Sentencing laws that were attempts to help restore the credibility of
the criminal justice system and deter crime. Subsequent analyses, however, have found that
while “getting tough” on crime increases incarceration rates, the “Three Strikes” and Truth in
Sentencing laws have had very limited national impacts on the volume and composition of
correctional populations (Chen, Turner, Greenwood, & Fain, 2001).
Truth in Sentencing requires that certain sentenced offenders (usually violent offenders)
spend a fixed percentage of their sentences—usually 85 percent, but sometimes as much as 100
percent, and occasionally less than 85 percent—behind bars (Chen, Turner, Greenwood, & Fain,
2001). These policies are intended to limit the common practice of releasing prisoners as a result
of “good time” credits long before their sentences are complete, or freeing them on parole or
other types of discretionary release.
5

b. “Tough on Crime” in Maine
A trend toward passage of Truth in Sentencing laws began around 1994. In that year,
the federal government offered substantial material incentives to states, as encouragement for
passing Truth in Sentencing laws Under-Title 11, Subtitle A of the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994. As amended, “the Crime Act” funding was authorized by
Congress to be used in an effort to increase prison and jail capacity to insure the incapacitation of
violent offenders for a substantial proportion of their sentences. The Crime Act included
authorizations of about $10 billion from the federal budget to the states for each of two
programs, Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth in Sentencing, from 1995 through 2000
(GAO Report, 1998). The intent of the TIS appropriation was to encourage states to require
violent offenders to serve 85% or more of their sentences (Chen, Turner, Greenwood, & Fain,
2001, p. 25).

Maine S 201 (1995):
…Reduces statutory meritorious good time to ensure that the term of imprisonment
imposed closely approximates that which will be served. Applies to all crimes and
prisoners.

By Chen’s estimation, these grants were a “key factor” in Maine’s decision to implement TIS
laws in the state (2001). As we will see, however, being “tough on crime” can also be tough on
the budget.
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II. Corrections Budget Crisis

State corrections spending is a controversial and, oftentimes, political battleground that
finds itself at the center of a great deal of scrutiny when budgets get tight, as they singularly have
over the last three years. A 2009 Pew Center study found that one in every 31 adults, or 7.3
million Americans, is in prison, on parole or probation, at a cost to the states of $47 billion in
2008. Criminal correction spending, it went on to report, is outpacing budget growth in
education, transportation and public assistance (Moore, 2009).

Maine’s low incarceration rates serve to diminish economies of scale achieved in states
with larger base populations and higher incarceration rates. At $44,379, Maine had the highest
average annual operating per inmate costs of any state in 2001 (Stephan, 2004). And, although
the state of Maine continues to have the lowest state prison incarceration rate per capita in the
nation (159 inmates per 100,000 residents), from 2006 to 2007, Maine’s state prison population
grew an estimated 4.6%, continuing the growth trend of recent years. This was the seventh
fastest growth in the country, and far surpassed the national average of 1.8% (Maine Statistical
Analysis Center, 2009). With this rate predicted to rise another 21% for the next 5 years (The
Pew Center on the States, 2009), Maine’s corrections spending may not be a problem now, but
could certainly become one if the current trends continues.
III. Drivers of Corrections Spending
The drivers behind corrections system costs are too numerous to name, however, recent
empirical analysis have identified a select few that can be affected by evidence-based methods.
Aimed at increasing efficiency, these innovations would ultimately decrease utilization of states’
correctional network, especially in the following areas of spending:
7

a. Health Care
Medical care is one of the principal cost drivers in corrections budgets today. From 1998
to 2001, healthcare spending in state prisons grew 10 percent annually, a 2004 report by the
Council of State Governments found. At the time of the study, medical care costs totaled $3.7
billion annually and accounted for about 10 percent of correctional spending (Kinsella, 2004).
States are compelled to provide a constitutionally adequate level of medical care, or care that
generally meets a “community standard” under the 1976 U.S. Supreme Court ruling Estelle v.
Gamble. Beyond that mandate, the rise in medical outlays stems largely from “mushrooming
costs associated with special needs populations, including HIV-positive prisoners and geriatric
inmates” (The Pew Center on the States, 2009).

b. Graying Population
Aging inmates is another factor, entirely, compounding this rising tide of the costs of
incarceration. Aging brings a host of new challenges in a prison setting, including many
medical, behavioral and social problems that complicate population management to the point of
requiring separate housing and special treatment. In the federal prisons, for example, about onequarter of the population was over 50 in 1989. By 2010, that proportion is forecast to grow to
one-third (The Pew Center on the States, 2009). Maine’s particular inmate composition is
slightly younger, but aging no less quickly: Comparing figures one and two, below, inmates
over the age of 50 represented 11.4% of Maine’s total inmate population in 2004. This number
grew to 14% only four years later, suggesting a quickly growing population of inmates with
more intensive living requirements.
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Figure 1: 2004 Maine Prison Inmate Population (by age) 2

Figure 2: 2008 Maine Prison Inmate Population (by age) 3:

2
3

(Rubin, 2005)
(Maine Statistical Analysis Center, 2009)
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c. Pretrial Case Processing

Delays in court appointed counsel can result in the unnecessary detention of pretrial
defendants due to delayed requests for bail reviews and, in some cases, delayed trials
(VanNostrand, 2006, p. 156). Maine’s Corrections Alternatives Advisory Committee (CAAC)
found that the average length of stay (65 days) for those pretrial defendants in a majority of
Maine jails is more than three times higher than those in other states (Final Report of the
Corrections Alternatives Advisory Committee, 2006). Figure 3 of Maine’s inmate population in
county jails by case status, below, illustrates the already high, and still-growing levels of pretrial
detainees in Maine’s jails, compared to the sentenced population.

Figure 3: 2006 Maine County Jails ADP by Case Status, 2001-2006 4

4

(VanNostrand, 2006)
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Admissions to county jails have increased dramatically, up 42 percent from 30,743 in 1990 to
43,519 in 2004. For every inmate admitted to a county jail to serve a sentence, seven defendants
are admitted for pretrial detention (Corrections Alternatives Advisory Committee, 2006).

d. Recidivism

Overall, 58.1% of prisoners released from Maine prisons in 2004 had already been reincarcerated by 2008. Of the 966 offenders released from prison in 2004, 561 had been returned
to prison by May 2008 (Maine Statistical Analysis Center, 2009). The Bureau of Justice
Statistics has found a nearly identical trend, in that of the nearly 650,000 offenders released into
the community, two-thirds will be convicted of a new crime within three years (Langan & Levin,
2002). Reducing rates of recidivism will be vital in ultimately reducing days spent in prison by
re-offenders. Figure 4, below, illustrates the steep continuum of recidivism risk by risk level
cohort:
Figure 4: One-Year Recidivism Rates for Maine Prisons by Risk Category and Cohort 5
2004

5

2005

2006

Risk Level

N

%

N

%

N

%

Administrative

85

10.1%

51

10.5%

34

8.6%

Low

48

29.3%

45

22.5%

114

20.4%

Moderate

574

22.0%

437

23.2%

385

24.1%

High

139

33.8%

121

36.7%

187

43.7%

Maximum

18

48.6%

25

48.1%

34

53.1%

Total

864

21.3%

679

23.0%

754

24.8%

(Maine Statistical Analysis Center, 2009)
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IV. Incarceration Alternatives – Nationally
States have shown a bias for prison spending even though it is much cheaper to monitor
convicts in community programs, including probation and parole, which require offenders to
report to law enforcement officers. A 2009 survey of 34 states found that states spent an average
of $29,000 a year on prisoners, compared with $1,250 on probationers and $2,750 on parolees.
The study found, furthermore, that “despite more spending on prisons, recidivism rates remained
largely unchanged” (Moore, 2009).
With average daily costs of incarceration more than seven times higher than other
sentencing options (Gramlich, 2009), alternatives to incarceration—or, any kind of punishment
other than time in prison or jail that can be given to a person who commits a crime—are finding
a new place in the toolkit of state correctional systems (Families Against Mandatory Minimums,
2011).
Over the past decade, hundreds of experimental courts have sprung up across the country,
to deal with problems like substance abuse and domestic violence (Corrections Alternatives
Advisory Committee, 2006). These "problem-solving courts" include specialized drug courts,
domestic violence courts, family treatment courts, mental health courts, re-entry courts and
others. Each of these initiatives targets a different problem, but seek to use the authority of
courts to improve outcomes for victims and defendants. In the process, the focus of the system
shifts from the simple processing of cases to achieving tangible results like recidivism reduction,
safer streets and stronger families (Families Against Mandatory Minimums, 2011). This
amounts to a significant departure from the traditional court model.
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V. Incarceration Alternatives - In Maine
Maine has recently made its own forays into incarceration alternatives, but must look to
other states’ examples and take more widespread action if efficiencies are to be found.

a. Pre-Trial Sentencing
The increasing average length of stay (ALOS) for pretrial offenders in Maine jails is one
of the major factors contributing to the increase in county jail population, and thus, costs (Maine
Statistical Analysis Center, 2009). In their Final Report, the CAAC identified changes in the bail
code and pre-trial processes as essential elements to reducing county jail totals. Further
examination of processing delays in bail adjudication and court appointed attorneys is warranted
in order to minimize the ALOS for pretrial offenders.

b. Risk Assessment
Over the last four years, the Maine Department of Corrections introduced a risk
assessment instrument, the Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) and case planning to its
management of probationers to help reduce the likelihood of an offender recidivating (or reoffending). The decision to manage its probation caseload by assessing risk helped Maine create
a system that more accurately measures the likelihood an offender will re-offend. It also
provides a framework to implement effective interventions to reduce recidivism (Maine
Statistical Analysis Center, 2009). These types of analyses help examine the impact of different
sentences on offender outcomes in order to identify best practices. It was through this type of
research, for example, that split-sentencing in Maine was identified as working only on high risk
offenders; lower risk offenders receiving a split sentence were more likely to recidivate than
13

those on straight probation (Rocque & Rubin, 2009). Understanding the most cost-efficient (in
terms of fiscal and criminal justice policy) manner in which to use incarceration should remain a
high priority for the state of Maine.

c. Resource Pooling
In 2008, Maine’s state Legislature established a State Board of Corrections (BOC) with
substantial oversight and authority of the task of unifying Maine’s correctional system, and a
State Sentencing and Corrections Practices Council, to assist the BOC with policy
recommendations for best correctional practices. Undoubtedly, unification of the fragmented
and unwieldy county corrections departments has the potential for great economies of scale (due
to the small size of the currently disparate independent prisons and jails sprinkled throughout the
state), and thus, significant savings. Especially where health care and special population
management are concerned, collectivizing the needs of Maine’s prison system will allow
heretofore unachievable economies of scale (through centralization) and increased purchasing
power (for prescription drugs and complex healthcare services).
Whether the BOC and CPC will be able to make the sometimes-hard choices necessary to
consolidate prudently is the real trick. Indeed, starting in the Fall of 2008, the Board began
developing a restructuring plan and capital construction strategies in order to, they say, “increase
the state’s capacity to identify more effective means of reducing the recidivism rate, [through
which] the costs of the new state-wide system will be reduced, and the savings redirected to
urgently needed community corrections alternatives” (Maine Statistical Analysis Center, 2009).
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d. Justice Reinvestment
An old concept with a new name, Justice Reinvestment describes an initiative where
policy makers working with researchers identify the state and local policies that are driving
prison growth, and then use sophisticated modeling techniques to forecast the impact of various
policy changes on the prison population and on the costs. By taking a science-based approach.,
justice reinvestment helps ask a critical question: “By reallocating funds from our most
expensive correctional tool (prisons) to a portfolio of alternatives (mandatory community
supervision, drug courts, HOPE Probation), can we get more public safety with fewer dollars?”
(Gelb, 2010).
By utilizing a justice reinvestment approach, even especially prison-heavy states like
Texas have been able to see savings in their corrections system: by diverting a quarter of a
billion dollars from a foregone billion dollar prison building project into a network of
community-based and residential programs, Texas has reduced its prison population, crime rate,
and has saved $210 million over the following two years (Council of State Governments Justice
Center, 2010). Anchoring their approach was a broad changes in parole practices, and dramatic
expansion of drug treatment and diversion beds, many of them in secure facilities; all what
amounted to a virtual makeover of the state correctional system through justice reinvestment.
Justice reinvestment marries firm analytic concepts with a bipartisan, multi-branch
approach that functions under the premise that “prisons are a government spending program, and
just like any other government program, they should be put to the cost-benefit test” (Gelb, 2010)
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e. Problem-Solving Courts
A recent survey by the Maine Civil Liberties Union found that nearly 60 percent of the
inmates reported they had a substance abuse problem and 39 percent described themselves as
suffering from a mental illness. Moreover, 25 percent of Maine inmates are reported to be in
mental health therapy or counseling programs (Maine Civil Liberties Union, 2004). The Maine
Judicial Branch is leading a series of new initiatives that are changing how the courts handle
special cases. There are currently three different types of problem solving courts in use in
various counties throughout the state; Drug Treatment Courts, Domestic Violence Case
Coordination Projects, and Co-occurring Disorders (such as Mental Illness and Substance Abuse)
Court—all of which deploy a comprehensive, collaborative, multi-disciplinary approach to
addressing the needs of defendants/offenders appearing before the courts (Anspach, Ferguson, &
Phillips, 2004). Mental Health and Criminal Justice courts would provide judicial supervision—
including periodic review—over offenders with mental illness, mental retardation, or cooccurring mental illness and substance abuse disorders that are charged with misdemeanors
and/or nonviolent offenses (Rubin, 2005), and have already provided programmatic success and
cost savings for both juveniles and adults supported through Maine’s drug courts (Anspach,
Ferguson, & Phillips, 2004).
Furthermore, revising policies related to court attorney appointment, Drug Treatment
Court admissions, grand jury summoning, and the presence of Lawyers of the Day at initial
appearances can all lead to significant efficiency gains in case processing that lead to systemwide cost savings down the road. Additional Maine Judicial Branch resources focused on the
“front end” of the system will produce significant improvements in efficiency, effectiveness, and
pretrial justice.
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f. Probation Reform
In a survey of the literature on evidence-based practices in community corrections, the
worsening performance of higher risk probationers is likely due to increased supervision, without
adequate service provision aimed at changing offending attitudes and behaviors. In order to
successfully address this higher risk population and achieve real reductions in recidivism rates,
research suggests smaller caseloads, and the placement of offenders into sufficiently intensive
cognitive-behavioral interventions that target their specific needs (Maine Statistical Analysis
Center, 2009).
Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) program offers one such
example of an innovative probation program that has been successful elsewhere. The HOPE
program uses the threat of short jail stays (typically starting at a few days, servable on weekends
for employed probationers, for the first violation and increasing thereafter, eventually escalating
to periods of months in residential treatment) as a disincentive for non-compliance. Treatment is
mandated only for those who repeatedly violate probation rules; for other probationers with drug
problems it is available, but not required. In a randomized controlled evaluation, HOPE
probationers were 55 percent less likely than the control group to be arrested for a new crime; 72
percent less likely to use drugs; 61 percent less likely to skip probation appointments; and use 48
percent less jail and prison space (Gelb, 2010). Alternative probation programs like HOPE
probation, can be utilized to address dynamic risk factors that, when addressed or changed, can
positively affect the offender’s risk for recidivism.
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VI. Indirect Factors in Corrections Spending
A 2009 synthesis of corrections spending studies by John Ellwood and Joshua Guetzkow
went further than most research in investigating the question of statistically significant
relationships between the cultural factors of a state, and its trends in corrections spending. The
study looks at four different categories of independent variables, including socioeconomic,
political, criminal, and procedural.
Perhaps even more interesting than what the study confirms, are the correlations the study
determines to be insignificant or even counterintuitive. The study confirms the natural
assumption that state corrections spending increases with its violent crime and incarceration
rates. Personal income and consumer price index are also correlated with corrections spending.
The report points out surprisingly, however, that a state’s Metropolitan composition and property
crime rate are actually negatively associated with corrections spending.
Looking at Figure 5, below, several of the significant relationships from the report
become evident, including:
•

As one would expect, the level of state spending on corrections is positively
associated with state personal income, and significantly associated with the state’s
incarceration rate

•

Corrections spending is significantly associated with the state’s incarceration rate,
but is inversely (but not significantly) associated with the state’s property-crime
rate

•

State spending on corrections is negatively associated with an index of the degree
to which the state’s elected officials are from the Democratic Party

•

Spending on corrections is correlated significantly to the percentage of the state
population that is African American
18

•

The presence of a direct initiative is inversely associated with corrections
spending

•

Neither the presence of term limits, nor possession of a supermajority voting
requirement to enact tax increases are associated significantly with corrections
spending

19

Figure 5: Multivariate analysis of state spending against social factors, 1977 to 1998 6

6

(Ellwood & Guetzkow, 2009)
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Moving beyond the socioeconomic factors influencing corrections spending, Ellwood and
Guetzkow turn their scrutiny to the effect budgeting practices, themselves, have on the levels of
corrections spending in states. Looking at the changes in budgeting conditions, alone, reveals
similarly significant correlations between variables. A 2007 study of the effect of six different
budgetary practices in state expenditures illuminates both the recent increased emphasis on fiscal
rigor, and the correlations hidden in the data.
Data from Jaime Alderete’s extensive 2007 survey of state budget practices and their
effect on trends in spending is illuminating because of its breadth (the study examines all 50
states over 14 years), and the uniqueness of its subject. Figure 6, below, summarizes the number
of states implementing any of six budgetary procedures during the study:
Figure 6: Number of states utilizing respective budgetary practices on spending, 1988 to 2002 7

Ellwood and Guetzkow went on to synthesize the data from that 2007 study that
examined the quantitative connections between budget practices. Remarkably, two of the six
practices studied proved to be significantly correlated, indicating a causal negative relationship
between their usage and corrections spending in those states. Figure 7, below, illustrates how the
7

(Alderete, 2007)
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existence of funding targets and performance measurement are associated with statistically
significant lower levels of total state corrections spending. In this case, funding targets serve to
guide executive branch agencies to adhere to bottom-line budget numbers when developing their
budgets before the official budget is finalized and presented. Performance Measurement, as
defined in the study, is a strategy wherein government agencies use measures (such as recidivism
rates) to benchmark their success in carrying out their missions.
Figure 7: Correlation of budgetary practices on spending, 1988 to 2002 8

8

(Ellwood & Guetzkow, 2009)
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VII. Conclusion
Maine is already starting to do its part to create internal structures (like the Corrections
Alternatives Advisory Committee and the State Board of Corrections) that are empowered to
look for innovative improvements to its diffuse patchwork of prisons and jails, and the services it
provides both its residents and the public at large whom it serves. This is important because,
although small when compared nationally, Maine’s spending on corrections is still a significant
amount of budget that isn’t going towards schools, roads, and other state functions. And, no
matter how little, any amount of public funds wasted on inefficient and unnecessary correctional
methods is too much.
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